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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UCA § 78-2-2(3)(j), as 
amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Regarding Plaintiff/Appellant Stone Flood and Fire, Inc.: Did the trial 
court incorrectly rule that the statute of limitations barred appellant Stone Flood and 
Fire's claims as a matter of law? 
Standard of Review: "The applicability of a statute of limitations and the 
applicability of the discovery rule are questions of law, which we review for correctness." 
Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, f 18, 108 P.3d 741, 745. 
Preservation: This issue was raised below in the parties' briefing at R. 109-231, 
313-321, 829-836, 935-940, and in the Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on All Claims, R. 929-933, Tentative Ruling 
For Hearing Feb. 5, 2010, R. 949-968, and Order Granting Motion to Reconsider and 
Dismissing All Remaining Claims, R. 973-974. 
2. Regarding Appellants James and Patrice Stone: Did the trial court 
incorrectly rule that James and Patrice lacked standing to bring claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and breach of the implied covenants of good faith and fair 
dealing? 
Standard of Review: "[F]or standing, we review legal determinations for 
correctness, affording deference for 'factual determinations that bear upon the question of 
standing,' but minimal deference to the district court's application of the facts to the law." 
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Cedar Mountain Envtl, Inc. v. Tooele County ex rel Tooele County Comm'n, 2009 UT 
48, \ 7, 214 P.3d 95 (quoting Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, U 10, 154 P.3d 808). 
Preservation: This issue was raised in the parties' briefing at R. 109-231, 313-321, 
323-331, and in the Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on All Claims, R. 929-933, Tentative Ruling For Hearing Feb. 5, 
2010, R. 949-968, and Order Granting Motion to Reconsider and Dismissing All 
Remaining Claims, R. 973-974. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313: Limitations of actions. 
(1) An action on a written policy or contract of first party insurance must be 
commenced within three years after the inception of the loss. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (1) or elsewhere in this title, the law 
applicable to limitation of actions in Title 78B, Chapter 2, Statutes of 
Limitations, applies to actions on insurance policies. 
(3) An insurance policy may not: 
(a) limit the time for beginning an action on the policy to a time less 
than that authorized by statute; 
(b) prescribe in what court an action may be brought on the policy; or 
(c) provide that no action may be brought, subject to permissible 
arbitration provisions in contracts. 
(4) Unless by verified complaint it is alleged that prejudice to the complainant 
will arise from a delay in bringing suit against an insurer, which prejudice 
is other than the delay itself, no action may be brought against an insurer on 
an insurance policy to compel payment under the policy until the earlier of: 
(a) 60 days after proof of loss has been furnished as required under the 
policy; 
(b) waiver by the insurer of proof of loss; or 
(c) the insurer's denial of full payment. 
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(5) The period of limitation is tolled during the period in which the parties 
conduct an appraisal or arbitration procedure prescribed by the insurance 
policy, by law, or as agreed to by the parties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-112: 
The duration of an injunction or statutory prohibition which delays the filing of an 
action may not be counted as part of the statute of limitations. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, and disposition below 
This case arises out of a major fire that occurred on November 16-17, 2000, and 
the alleged failure of defendant/appellee Safeco Insurance Company of America 
("Safeco") to timely and adequately make payments under an insurance policy. 
Appellants allege that, as a result, Stone Flood and Fire Restoration, Inc. ("Stone Flood"), 
a thriving business before the fire, became bankrupt. James and Patrice Stone ("James 
and Patrice" or "the Stones"), sole owners of the business, infused hundreds of thousands 
of dollars of their personal money into the business trying to keep it afloat during the 
dispute with Safeco, but to no avail. The Stones were left with hundreds of thousands of 
dollars of debt, damaged reputations due to Safeco's early accusations of arson, stress-
related health problems, and other consequential damages. 
Stone Flood initially filed suit on November 15, 2002 (Stone Flood Suit I). (R. 
163, 295.) On February 3, 2003, Safeco invoked an appraisal provision in the insurance 
policy, giving notice to Stone Flood of its election to have the loss appraised. (R. 667.) 
Although Stone Flood had not objected to Safeco's invocation of the appraisal procedure, 
Safeco subsequently filed a motion with the trial court to compel an appraisal. (R. 666-
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669; 672-673.) The court granted the unopposed motion on July 11, 2003. (R. 166.) For 
various reasons, the appraisers did not issue their initial decision until January 9, 2007. 
(R. 173-177.) Because of the length of the appraisal process, the court had dismissed 
without prejudice Stone Flood Suit I for lack of prosecution. (R. 171; 297.) 
For a few months following the appraiser's initial decision, the parties 
unsuccessfully explored settlement. (R. 289; 676-677; 191; R 1020, p. 13-15; 408.) 
Stone Flood then re-filed its lawsuit on May 22, 2007 (Stone Flood Suit II). (R. 1-9.) 
Separate from Stone Flood Suit I, James and Patrice Stone filed a personal lawsuit 
against Safeco on November 17, 2003 (Stones Suit I), alleging intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and breach of good faith duties. (R. 287; 408.) Counsel for both sides 
stipulated to stay these claims pending the appraisal process and agreed that the statute of 
limitations would be tolled. (R. 287; 680; 687-689.) Thereafter, on September 16, 2005, 
the court dismissed without prejudice the Stones Suit I for lack of prosecution. (R. 171.) 
On September 17, 2007, James and Patrice re-filed their personal claims against Safeco 
by joining the Stone Flood Suit II. (R. 12-19.) 
More than two years into the current litigation, Safeco argued that the claims of 
Stone Flood, James and Patrice are barred by the statute of limitations. Safeco also raised 
various other arguments in seeking summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims. (R. 109-
160.) 
In a ruling issued November 3, 2009, the trial court granted in part and denied in 
part Safeco's motion for summary judgment on the Stones' personal claims, initially 
ruling that: (a) an issue of fact existed regarding whether the statute of limitations had run 
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on James and Patrice's claims, and (b) sufficient evidence existed to support the Stones' 
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (R. 929-933.) 
Upon further consideration, the trial court issued a memorandum decision on 
January 26, 2010, modifying his prior ruling and holding that, regardless of the issues of 
fact previously identified, James and Patrice lacked standing to sue Safeco personally 
under the Utah Court of Appeals decision in Stocks v. United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty Co., 3 P.3d 722, 2000 UT App 139. (R. 949-968.) The court then issued its 
final order, dismissing all claims of Stone Flood and James and Patrice on February 5, 
2010. (R. 973-974.) 
The trial court further ruled that, as a matter of law, the statute of limitations on all 
of Stone Flood's claims had expired a few days before the filing of Stone Flood Suit II. 
(R. 930-931.) 
Stone Flood and the Stones timely appealed. (R. 1018.) 
Statement of facts 
A. General Overview 
Stone Flood and James and Patrice purchased a comprehensive business policy 
that provided, among other coverages, "business interruption" and "additional expense" 
coverages which are designed to financially protect a business during the critical business 
interruption period following a catastrophe. After a major fire (which occurred on 
November 16-17, 2000) that burned the Stones' business location, the Stones were faced 
with a significant decline in revenue, substantial increases in overhead and expenses, and 
the inability to resume business operations. 
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Rather than making timely payments under the business interruption coverages, 
Safeco made unfounded accusations of arson against James and Patrice and did not make 
its first payment for loss of income until approximately three and one-half months after 
the fire, during which time the Stones were unable to meet payroll and other overhead 
expenses. Due to the financial distress, the Stones laid off numerous employees and 
downsized operations, which in turn resulted in diminished work, damaged business 
relationships and lost opportunities. James and Patrice tried to shore up the business by 
infusing hundreds of thousands of dollars of their personal money into the company 
while waiting for Safeco's promised payments. Though Safeco eventually paid all of its 
policy limits over a period of seven years, the initial payments were grossly inadequate 
and very delinquent. Stone Flood could not recover and by 2005, it was out of business. 
B. Background 
James and Patrice Stone ("James and Patrice") were the owners of Stone Flood 
and Fire Restoration, Inc. during all relevant times. Since 1983, James and Patrice had 
been successfully involved in the restoration business through different companies, which 
evolved over time. In 2000, the name of their business was Stone Flood and Fire 
Restoration, Inc ("Stone Flood"). (R. 261-262; 378, p.8-9; 394, p. 18-19; 618-619, ffll 2-
6.)1 
To expand their business opportunities, Stone Flood took out an SBA loan in 
August 2000 in the amount of $750,000, which was guaranteed by James and Patrice. 
1
 In its reply memorandum, Safeco did not respond to nor contest any of the Stones' 
statement of facts. (R. 731-759). 
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Stone Flood was profitable every month from its inception until the time of the fire on 
November 17, 2000. Its clientele continued to grow, and it was considered along with 
Utah Disaster Kleenup as one of the two best restoration companies in Utah. It was 
meeting all of its obligations and overhead, and there were no financial difficulties. (R. 
263; 619-620, ffi[ 7-8.) 
C. The Fire 
A fire began during the late evening of Thursday, November 16, 2000, and 
continued into the morning of November 17, 2000. The fire burned nearly all of Stone 
Flood's office and restoration equipment (including the computers which contained their 
financial data), supplies, inventory, and vehicles that were stored in the building, and 
some personal property owned separately by James and Patrice. It also burned 
approximately $40,000 of revenue checks that had been recently received but not yet 
deposited. (R. 264-265; 620-621, ^ 9-11, 13; 270.) 
D. The Safeco Insurance Policy 
The Safeco insurance policy issued to Stone Flood was a comprehensive 
commercial policy that included coverage for losses caused by a fire, including damage 
to the building, loss of personal property (including personal property of James and 
Patrice), business income loss and extra expenses incurred from the date of the fire until 
the restoration was complete and operations had returned to normal. (R. 265-268; 335-
375.) 
Safeco's policy has a provision for appraisal, should the parties be unable to agree 
on the amount of the loss. The provision reads: 
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If we and you disagree on the amount of Net Income and operating 
expenses or the amount of loss, either may make written demand for an 
appraisal of the loss. In this event, each party will select a competent and 
impartial appraiser. 
The two appraisers will select an umpire. If they cannot agree, either may 
request that selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction. 
The appraisers will state separately the amount of Net Income and 
operating expense or amount of loss. If they fail to agree, they will submit 
their differences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will be 
binding...." 
(R. 268; 343.) 
E. Safeco's Handling of the Claim 
On November 17, 2000, the Stones gave notice of the fire to Safeco. A Safeco 
adjuster came to the scene and explained to the Stones the business interruption insurance 
and other coverages that would help get them financially through the difficult time when 
they couldn't conduct their business. The Stones expressed an urgent need for money to 
help make payroll and pay other overhead and operating expenses. The Safeco adjuster 
told the Stones, "That's why you have this insurance," and agreed to start making 
payments immediately. (R. 269-270; 621-622, fflj 12-13; 634-635, ffi[ 9-10; 384, pp. 78-
80.) 
The adjuster insisted that the Stones (who were in the restoration business) 
perform the clean-up, demolition and restoration work, for which he said Safeco would 
immediately pay. Relying thereon, the Stones pulled their employees from good paying 
jobs and performed the restoration at their burned location, however, Safeco later refused 
to pay for all of the work. (R. 270; 622-623, f 18; 636, % 15.) 
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Within a few days of the fire, the city and state fire marshals had concluded that 
the origin of the fire was electrical and accidental. Around the same time, a fire 
investigator retained by Farmers Insurance, the insurer of the building owner, reached the 
same conclusion. Safeco, however, appeared determined to establish arson. (R. 270-271; 
622, H 14; 653-654; 656-659; 661-662.) 
Instead of making the promised payments, Safeco began to accuse the Stones of 
setting the fire themselves. The Stones' employees were interrogated and told that, "the 
Stones have done this before," for which there was no supporting evidence. There was 
even media coverage originating with Safeco that the Stones may have engaged in arson. 
No one besides Safeco alleged arson. Over a period of many months, the Safeco adjuster 
made accusatory remarks about the Stones, threatening that if Safeco could prove arson, 
the Stones would have to pay back any advanced payments. (R. 271-272; 622, ^} 16-17; 
399, pp. 98-100; 429-430, pp. 124-128; 417, p. 178.) 
The Stones' business operations diminished rapidly. Safeco demanded copies of 
extensive financial records, but nearly all of the Stone's financial and other internal 
records had been destroyed in the fire. (R. 272-273; 623, If 19; 636-637, If 16; 412-413, 
pp. 56-59; 431, pp. 140-141.) 
In December, Safeco indicated that it was willing to advance $25,000 on the 
condition that James and Patrice signed a non-waiver agreement, wherein they would be 
The only evidence that could have possibly supported this false accusation was the 
fact that years earlier, James' estranged brother had committed arson. James was the one 
who turned his brother in, and helped law enforcement prosecute his brother. James was 
never a suspect. Neither James nor Patrice has ever been involved in a fire and/or any 
event involving alleged arson. (R. 272.) 
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personally liable to repay any amounts advanced if Safeco later determined there was no 
coverage. (R. 664.) Being desperate, James and Patrice signed. However, this amount 
was grossly inadequate. With approximately 80 to 100 employees, payroll alone every 
15 days was approximately $125,000. Stone Flood had no choice but to start laying off 
employees which it did, starting just before Christmas 2000. (R. 273-274; 623-624, fflj 
20-22; 431, p. 139.) 
James and Patrice made heroic efforts to save the business by infusing hundreds of 
thousands of dollars of their own personal funds into the business. They borrowed 
against their life insurance policies (which they later lost). They used funds set aside for 
their retirement, borrowed against their home, used their personal savings, and 
consolidated their operations by closing Stone Flood's other offices in Dallas and Salt 
Lake City. They had James' father, Conrad Stone, borrow against his own home and 
give the proceeds to James and Patrice for Stone Flood's use. James and Patrice had 
personally guaranteed many of Stone Floods obligations. Stone Flood finally went out of 
business in 2004, leaving the Stones with hundreds of thousands of dollars of personal 
indebtedness and a ruined credit rating. All of these circumstances were known by 
Safeco, who seemed indifferent to these adverse effects. (R. 280; 627-628, f^ 37; 642-
643, f 36-37; 391, p. 160; 475-476, pp. 145-146; 513, H 20.) 
These events took a heavy toll on Patrice Stone's health. She could not sleep, and 
was experienced panic and anxiety attacks. She sought medical treatment with doctors 
and counseling, and began taking anti-depressants and sleeping medications. She was 
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taken to the emergency room on more than one occasion with stress symptoms similar to 
a heart attack. (R. 281; 628, ^ 38; 390, p. 142-143; 397, pp. 85-88.) 
There was ample evidence that had Safeco made timely payments, Stone Flood 
would have survived and continued successfully. (R. 281; 420, p. 222; 505-506; 627, *j| 
35; 642, % 34.) 
F. Facts Regarding the Stone's Lawsuits and Appraisal 
Stone Flood Suit I (Provo) 
On November 15, 2002, Stone Flood filed a Complaint in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court against defendant Safeco, alleging wrongful conduct and seeking benefits, 
consequential damages and punitive damages. After answering the complaint, Safeco 
exercised its right under the insurance policy to have the fire loss determined by 
Appraisal in a letter dated February 3, 2003 ("the Appraisal"). 
Though Stone Flood did not object, on April 3, 2003, Safeco filed a Motion to 
Submit to Arbitration/Appraisal and Stay Proceedings. Stone Flood did not resist the 
motion, and on July 11, 2003, the court issued an order staying the proceedings pending 
the Appraisal. The court ultimately dismissed Stone Flood Suit I for failure to prosecute 
on September 16, 2005. (R. 285-286; 168-171; 666-669; 672-673; 166.) 
Appraisal Process 
Consistent with the Policy provision (R. 343), the parties selected two appraisers 
to determine the loss. On January 9, 2007, the two appraisers issued written 
The policy states, "If they fail to agree, they will submit their differences to the 
umpire [third appraiser]." See p. 7 above. 
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opinions describing each item where they agreed and where they disagreed. Since there 
were disagreements between the two appraisers, the Appraisal process had not yet been 
concluded, however, as appraisers they did nothing further because Stone Flood refiled its 
lawsuit4 (R. 286; 408; 173-177.) 
The Stones' Suit I 
Retaining new counsel, James and Patrice filed a lawsuit against Safeco on 
November 17, 2003 ("the Stones' Suit I"). In early January, 2004, James and Patrice 
proposed a stipulation to: (a) consolidate Stone Flood Suit I and the Stones' Suit I, and (b) 
enlarge the Appraisal process to include all of the Stones in both actions. Safeco's 
counsel initially agreed to consolidate the two cases, but wanted to further consider 
enlarging the Appraisal proceeding. (R. 287-288; 676-677; 685; 680.) 
On May 26, 2004, defense counsel responded that he had authority to consolidate 
the "Appraisal process for the two (2) pending cases. I would propose that we file a joint 
motion to stay the most recently filed case and have our clients agree that the Appraisal 
process will include the amounts being claimed by all Plaintiffs." (R. 680.) (emphasis 
added). 
A stipulation was signed by defense counsel, the pertinent part of which states: 
The parties believe it is in the best interest of everyone, and is most judicially 
efficient, to pursue Appraisal to determine the amount of insurance benefits owing 
Because of the huge expense to employ the appraisers, the parties stipulated that 
each could use its own appraiser as an economic expert in the litigation. (R. 289, \ 69; 
408.) 
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under the policy. These amounts must first be determined, in any event, before 
plaintiffs' [James and Patrice] other claims may be adjudicated. 
The parties stipulate that the Court should enter an order staying these 
proceedings [James' and Patrice's lawsuit] while the parties pursue the Appraisal 
process. 
The parties further stipulate that the claims of plaintiffs, James K. Stone 
and Patrice Stone, may be dismissed without prejudice. The claims of these two 
plaintiffs may be refiled, in the event that plaintiffs' counsel discovers evidence 
that they are insureds under the defendant's insurance policy. It is intended that 
the statute of limitations be tolled as it relates to these dismissed claims until 
discovery is completed, 
(Emphasis added). (R. 687-689.) Fact discovery was not completed until May 22, 2009. 
(R. 99.)5 
Counsel for both parties agreed that nothing further would be done until the 
Appraisal was completed, after which the parties would attempt to negotiate a settlement 
of any remaining issues. All of this was with the expressed intent to have a complete 
arrest of all litigation, which meant the lawsuits might be dismissed without prejudice. 
(R. 288, TJ 67; 676-677; 680; 687-689; 693-695; 1020, pp. 13-15; 1021, pp. 69-71.) 
Stone Flood Suit II 
Shortly after the January 9, 2007, Appraisal letter, counsel for each party discussed 
resolving the case through settlement rather than further pursuing Appraisal or a lawsuit. 
Settlement discussions took place, but the negotiations over the next few months did not 
offer much optimism for success. (R. 289; 676-677; 191; R 1020, p. 13-15; 408.) 
The trial court found this tolling agreement to be "hopelessly ambiguous." (R. 1020, p. 
28.) 
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Stone Flood filed its second lawsuit on May 22, 2007 (Stone Flood Suit II) and the 
complaint was later amended to add James and Patrice on September, 17, 2007. (R. 12-
19.) At the close of discovery, Safeco moved for summary judgment, which the trial 
court ultimately granted, as described above. This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's erred in ruling as a matter of law that Stone Flood missed the 
statute of limitations in its re-filed lawsuit by three days. The court first erred in 
concluding that the "inception of the loss" for purposes of the statute was the day of the 
fire, November 16-17, 2000. Particularly in the context of bad faith, the court's 
definition means that the statute of limitations began running before a cause of action 
even existed, contrary to longstanding principles of law. 
Moreover, this Court's earlier decision in Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 2002 UT 54, 53 P.3d 947 suggests that a more appropriate reading of the statute is 
that inception of the loss for purposes of the statute of limitations occurs only after one of 
the prerequisites to filing suit has taken place. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-
313(4) "prohibits filing an action until, among other things, the insurer denies full 
payment." In this case, none of those triggering events occurred within three days of the 
fire. 
The court next erred in declining to deduct from its calculation the 60 days during 
which insureds are prohibited from filing suit under Section 31A-21-313(4). Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-2-112 states that the duration of any "statutory prohibition which delays the 
filing of an action may not be counted as part of the statute of limitations." The trial 
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court erroneously assumed that this provision does not apply to first-party insurance 
claims, but the language of the statute does not support the court's assumption. 
Additionally, regardless of whether Section 78B-2-112 applies, if the insurance statute of 
limitations is interpreted consistent with well-settled common law principles, by 
operation of law the 60 days would not be counted. Applying a tolling provision does not 
contravene or conflict with a statute of limitations; it merely defines certain days that are 
not counted when applying the statute. 
The court next erred in ruling that statutory tolling of the limitations period during 
the appraisal process did not commence upon Safeco's written demand for appraisal 
under the policy, but instead only commenced when an uncontested court order for 
appraisal was entered five months later. Under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(5), 
statutes of limitations are automatically tolled "during the period in which the parties 
conduct an appraisal or arbitration procedure prescribed by the insurance policy . . . ." 
The procedure prescribed by the policy triggered the appraisal process through the 
sending of a written demand, which occurred on February 3, 2003. The fact that Safeco 
later filed an uncontested motion and obtained a superfluous court order could not serve 
to rewrite the policy's own provision for commencing the appraisal procedure. 
Finally, the court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Stone Flood's claims were 
not encompassed within a tolling agreement entered into between the parties' counsel. 
The court found that the tolling agreement itself was "hopelessly ambiguous," yet 
concluded as a matter of law that it covered by the Stones individually, and not Stone 
Flood. That finding, however, ignores correspondence between the parties' counsel 
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expressly mentioning that the lawsuits by both parties would be put on hold. The trial 
court's conclusion that Stone Flood is nonetheless excluded from the agreement because 
such an agreement would have been unnecessary to protect its rights is not a legal or 
realistic approach to contracts: Contracts are enforceable regardless of whether they state 
the obvious or confer entirely new rights. 
With respect to the claims of James and Patrice Stone, the trial court erred in 
reluctantly finding that it was obligated to dismiss those claims for lack of standing. 
First, Safeco appears to have treated or recognized the Stones as insureds, for example, 
by requiring them to personally guarantee reimbursement of payments made by Safeco to 
the corporation, which it could not legally have forced them to do if they were not 
insureds. 
Additionally, the very fact that Safeco imposed such requirements on the Stones 
shows why claims by shareholders in closely held corporations should not be subject to 
the usual rule that shareholders may not assert a claim for breach of duty to a corporation. 
Safeco would never have asked passive investors in IBM to personally guarantee 
repayment of benefits paid to the company; it recognized a difference with a small 
company with two known, active shareholders. 
The trial court also acknowledged this distinction, but erroneously believed that it 
was compelled by the Court of Appeals decision in Stocks v. United States Fid. & Guar. 
Co. to dismiss the Stones' claims. First, the court's ruling overlooked the fact that the 
Stones' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and bad faith alleged the 
breach of independent duties owed to them. Second, the court failed to take into account 
16 
the fact that Safeco's actions rendered the Stones individually liable on personal 
guarantees, and imposed statutory liability on them. Finally, unlike a typical corporate 
scenario, Safeco was fully aware of, and disregarded, the harm being done to the Stones 
personally as a result of its actions toward the corporation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CALCULATED THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON STONE FLOOD'S CLAIMS, OR 
AN ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS IN THAT REGARD. 
In its motion for summary judgment, Safeco argued that Stone Flood's claims are 
barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-
313(1) ("An action on a written policy or contract of first party insurance must be 
commenced within three years after the inception of the loss.")- The statute of limitations 
is an affirmative defense upon which Safeco bore the burden of proof. Barnard & Burk 
Group, Inc. v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 401, If 13, 122 P.3d 700. 
The trial court granted Safeco's motion, dismissing Stone Flood's claims. The 
trial court's ruling was based upon several subsidiary rulings, all of which must be 
correct as a matter of law for the court's calculation to stand. Specifically, the court 
concluded or assumed: (1) That "the inception of the loss" for purposes of the three-year 
statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(1) was November 16-17, 2000; 
(2) that the statutory bar against filing suit against an insurer within 60 days of proof of 
loss or denial of payment did not toll the limitation period; (3) that statutory tolling 
during the appraisal process did not commence upon Safeco's written demand for 
appraisal under the policy; and (4) that Stone Flood's claims were not encompassed 
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within a tolling agreement entered into between appellants' counsel and Safeco's 
(former) counsel. 
Based upon these underlying determinations, the trial court concluded that Stone 
Flood missed the statute of limitations in its refiling by three days. (With a three-year 
statute of limitations, a claim must be filed within 1095 days. The trial court concluded 
that, based upon its rulings and assumptions, 1098 days lapsed before the re-filing. See 
R. 1020, p. 4.) 
Because the trial court concluded that Stone Flood missed the statute by only three 
days, any error or question of fact as to any of the subsidiary rulings compels reversal of 
the summary judgment. As discussed below, Stone Flood believes that the trial court 
erred in each of the subsidiary rulings as a matter of law. 
A, The "inception of the loss" was not November 16-17, 2000, but 
when Stone Flood knew or should have known that Safeco 
would not honor its obligations under the policy. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-313(l) provides that, "An action on a written policy or 
contract of first party insurance must be commenced within three years after the inception 
of the loss." The trial court ruled that "the inception of the loss occurred on November 
16-17, 2000, the date of the catastrophic fire in Stone Flood's building[.]" Accordingly, 
the court found as a baseline that "the plaintiffs would have had to file their claim prior to 
November 17, 2003 in order to be timely under §31A-21-313." (R. 960, 962.)6 
6
 In a case where the statute was allegedly missed by 3 days, it warrants noting that the 
limitation period would run from when the fire was extinguished (November 17), rather 
than when it began (November 16). See, e.g., Johns v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 66 
Misc.2d 799, 322 N.Y.S.2d 324 (more persuasive argument is that statute of limitations 
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No Utah court has defined the term "inception of the loss" in the context of bad 
faith. See e.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 797-798 n. 8 (Utah 1991) 
(indicating that the Court had not yet addressed whether the "time for bringing an action 
for [a breach of implied duties of good faith and fair dealing] runs from the date of the 
harm caused by the breach of the covenant or from the date of the event triggering the 
insured's alleged liability on the policy"). 
Appellants respectfully submit that, in this context, "inception of the loss" for 
purposes of Section 31A-21-313(1) means when bad faith is alleged to have first 
occurred. Under any other reading, the statute of limitations would be running on a claim 
that did not even exist yet. Conceivably, in a complex case taking years to adjust, the 
statute of limitations could even expire before a cause of action had arisen at all. 
The interpretation urged herein is more consistent with the body of law generally 
recognizing that a cause of action accrues, and the relevant statute of limitations begins to 
run, only upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action. 
Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995) (internal 
would run from when the fire was extinguished; often it is not known when a 
conflagration started, whereas extinguishment is generally ascertainable from fire 
department records; "Certainly, an insured can have no idea of even the gross extent of 
his loss until after the fire has run its course."); see also Wood v. Allstate Insurance Co., 
21 F.3d 741, 743-744 (7th Cir. 2003) ("date of loss" limitation in policy is ambiguous 
"when a fire burns over more than one day," and would be construed as meaning the date 
on which the fire was extinguished). Presumably for these reasons, Safeco represented to 
the Stones throughout the adjustment process that it considered the date of loss to be 
November 17. See (R. 682) (checks from Safeco to Stone Flood identifying date of loss 
as 11-17-00), and also (R. 24) Safeco's Answer to Amended Complaint, \ 6 (admitting 
that fire was on November 17, 2000). 
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quotations omitted); see also Canadian Indemnity Co. v.K &Tf Inc., 745 F. Supp. 661, 
663 (D. Utah 1990) ("As early as 1927, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that c[t]he 
statutes of limitation do not begin to run until a suit or cause of action exists,'" citing 
Kimball v. McCornick, 259 P. 313, 317 (Utah 1927)). 
This reading is also consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-314, which 
prohibits insurers from issuing any insurance policy containing any provision "limiting 
the right of action against the insurer to less than three years from the date the cause of 
action accrues." (Emphasis added.) 
Stone Flood's interpretation further harmonizes two separate components of the 
statute of limitations, Section 31A-21-313(1) (the three year limitation) and Section 31A-
21-313(4) (an initial 60-day bar on filing suit). In this respect, this Court's opinion in 
Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, 53 P.3d 947 may be informative. 
At issue in Tucker was whether a claim for additional automobile accident-related 
Personal Injury Protection benefits was time-barred under Section 31A-21-313(1). In 
ruling that it was, the Court first defined the term "inception of the loss" as referring "to 
the time when the loss was first incurred or began to accrue." Id. at f^ 15 (citing 
Canadian Indemnity Co. v. K &T, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 661, 664 (D. Utah 1990)). The 
Court then noted that, under the same statute of limitations, "section 31A-21-313(4) 
prohibits filing an action until, among other things, the insurer denies full payment." Id. 
The statute referenced by the Court, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(4), provides: 
Unless by verified complaint it is alleged that prejudice to the complainant will 
arise from a delay in bringing suit against an insurer, which prejudice is other than 
20 
the delay itself, no action may be brought against an insurer on an insurance policy 
to compel payment under the policy until the earlier of: 
(a) 60 days after proof of loss has been furnished as required under the policy; 
(b) waiver by the insurer of proof of loss; or 
(c) the insurer's denial of full payment. 
Applying that subsection to the alleged failure to pay PIP benefits, Tucker 
concluded that inception of the loss occurred "no later than the date on which the insurer 
refuses to pay the disputed PIP benefits, and such refusal to pay constitutes denial of full 
payment under § 31A-21-313(4)(c)." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The Court noted 
that "State Farm reimbursed the Tuckers in November 1996 for the expenses it deemed to 
be necessary and informed the Tuckers that it would not reimburse the denied expenses 
unless the Tuckers could submit additional medical documentation showing the expenses 
were medically necessary." Tucker, 2002 UT 54, f 16. The Tuckers' lawsuit, filed more 
than three years after that denial, was too late, the Court concluded. 
In contrast to the approach taken in Tucker, the trial court here deemed irrelevant 
when the suit could have been filed under Section 31A-21-313(4) (i.e., when was Day 61 
following proof of loss, and/or after the Stones were on notice that Safeco was not paying 
what was owed under the policy). 
The trial court expressed concern that the "triggering events" identified in Section 
31A-2-313(4) for the filing of suit "could conceivably occur well outside of the three year 
The trial court assumes that "the complainant could easily file a verified complaint 
alleging prejudice, thereby waiving such limitations [the 60-day bar]." (R. 961.) But that 
assumption is far from clear - the statute expressly precludes a claimant from attempting 
this method of avoiding the bar by if the alleged prejudice is "the delay itself." Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(4). The trial court's reading could, for all practical purposes, 
render the 60-day bar meaningless. 
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time period after the inception of the loss." (R. 961.) Frankly, it is difficult to imagine a 
scenario in which the first proof of loss after an event would be filed more than three 
years later. (Most policies require submission of proofs much sooner, for example). In 
any event, under the court's ruling, the exact same could be said of an insurer's bad faith: 
Literally, an insurer would be free to commit bad faith with impunity at any point three 
years beyond the date of a fire or other calamity. No explanation has been provided for 
why the legislature would have intended such an anomalous result.8 
Because of its ruling in this case, the trial court did not require Safeco to establish 
when proof of loss was submitted, or when the Stones were placed on notice, actual or 
constructive, that Safeco was not going to pay as required by the policy. Safeco argued, 
however, that the Stones were on notice from the very day of the fire, citing a statement 
by Mrs. Stone on that day that the business had an "immediate need for cash" for payroll 
and suppliers. (See R. 867.) 
While Mrs. Stone's statement would hardly seem to satisfy Safeco's burden of 
proof of as a matter of law, in order to even make the argument, Safeco had to leave out 
The trial court cited Canadian Indemnity Co., supra, in support of its ruling. But that 
case, unlike Tucker, did not address or reconcile the 60-day bar against filing suit found 
in the same section of the insurance code. Moreover, Canadian Indemnity actually seems 
to support the Stones' interpretation. Although the opinion is not clear, it appears that an 
argument was made that the statute of limitations began to run before the insured had 
suffered any actual harm from the alleged wrongful denial of a defense. The district 
court ruled that the limitation period did not begin to run when the underlying lawsuit 
was filed, or the defense was denied, or the legal expenses were incurred, but only when 
the insured actually suffered a loss (payment of the bills) - in other words, when the last 
element necessary for a cause of action to accrue actually occurred. See id. at 664-665. 
That is not inconsistent with the Stones' position in this case. 
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three key words from its quotation. Considering that Stone Flood is alleged to have 
missed the statute by only three days, it is significant that Mrs. Stone's actual statement 
on November 17 was that they had an "immediate need for cash to help make payroll that 
was due in three days and to meet other overhead expenses . . . ." {See R. 269 from Pis' 
Statement of Facts, ^ 15 (emphasis added).) Under Safeco's own argument, therefore, 
the inception of the loss - the failure to pay - would not have occurred until at least three 
days later, when payroll came and went without help from Safeco. Accordingly, the 
statute would not have begun to run until then, and Stone Flood's re-filing was timely. 
B. The 60-day bar against filing suit tolled the limitation period by 
operation of law. 
As noted above, an insured cannot file suit against an insurance company until 60 
days after the occurrence of one or more triggering events. See pp. 20-21, supra. In 
calculating the three year limitation period, this 60-day filing bar should be excluded, 
both by statute and by common law. 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-1129 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-112 states: "The duration of an injunction or statutory 
prohibition which delays the filing of an action may not be counted as part of the statute 
Because the language of the statute has not changed during the relevant period, 
appellants cite to the current statute herein. 
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of limitations." By its express language, this provision would require the court to 
subtract the first 60 days after the fire from calculation of the limitation period.10 
The trial court concluded, however, that Section 78B-2-112 has no bearing on 
Section 31 A-21-313(1) (the three-year statute of limitations) because the immediately 
following section, 31A-21-313(2), states, "Except as provided in Subsection (1) or 
elsewhere in this title, the law applicable to limitation of actions in Title 78B, Chapter 2, 
Statutes of Limitations, applies to actions on insurance policies." (R. 963.) 
According to the trial court, this language bars the application of all provisions of 
Title 78B, Section 2 to claims governed by the limitation period in Section 31A-21-
313(1) {i.e., first-party insurance claims). The court's ruling states: "Thus, under the 
plain meaning of §31 A-21-313(2), any law applicable to the limitations of actions in Title 
78B only applies if §31 A-21-313(1) does not") (R. 963(emphasis in original)). 
With respect, that is not what Section 31 A-21-313(2) actually says. It states that 
the provisions of Title 78B, Chapter 2, apply "except as provided in Subsection (1)" 
(emphasis added). By its terms, therefore, the only instance in which a provision of Title 
78B-2 does not apply is when it conflicts with something expressly provided in 
Subsection (1). One obvious example would be Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-309, which 
specifies a limitation period of six years for actions on a written contract. That would 
conflict with the three-year period prescribed in Section 31 A-21-313(1). 
Because the filing was timely either way, Stone Flood assumes for this discussion that 
proof of loss was submitted to Safeco, and/or that Safeco denied full payment, on the 
very day of the fire, thus starting the 60-day clock on November 17, 2000. 
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By contrast, there is nothing in Section 31A-21-313(1) that conflicts with 
application of other provisions of Title 78B-2. Unlike provisions found elsewhere in the 
code, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(1) does not contain language barring the application 
of tolling provisions. See, by contrast, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-404(3) ("The limitations 
in this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability 
under Section 78B-2-108 or any other provision of the law."). 
Under the trial court's conclusion that none of the provisions of Title 78B-2 can 
ever apply to first-party insurance claims, the statute of limitations on such claims would 
run regardless of minority or disability (Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-108, -109, -110). 
Claims that are time-barred in another state would no longer be automatically barred in 
Utah (Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-103). The savings statute would not apply (Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-2-111). Governmental insureds would not be held to the same limitation 
periods as private parties (Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-115). 
None of the foregoing provisions conflicts with any provision of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-21-313(1), yet under the trial court's broad reading of Section 31A-21-313(2), 
they automatically have no application to claims under an insurance contract. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-2-112 similarly does not conflict with Section 313(1). It does not specify a 
different statute of limitations; it merely defines certain periods of time that are not to be 
counted when applying the existing three-year limitation. 
If the trial court's reading is correct, the filing of an action could be delayed 
because of an insurer's bankruptcy, or a policy provision prohibiting suit within an initial 
period of time, or an injunction, or any number of other legal prohibitions, and yet the 
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statute of limitations would be running the whole time. With respect, that is not a 
reasonable interpretation of the law. 
An additional difficulty with the trial court's refusal to apply Section 78B-2-112 in 
this case is that the court erroneously perceived that a "conflict" exists "between section 
31A-21-313(1) and section 31A-21-313(4)." (R. 960.) As noted earlier, there is no 
conflict: Three years still remains the statute of limitations, and insureds are still 
prohibited from filing suit within the first 60 days. Neither tramps the other; the statutes 
are fully harmonized by simply excluding the 60 days from the three-year period. 
Indeed, it is the trial court's reading that actually creates a conflict - it changes Section 
31A-21-313(1) from a three-year limitation period to a two-year and 10-month limitation 
period. 
2. Common law 
In any event, the trial court erroneously disregarded Stone Flood's alternative 
argument that, regardless of whether Section 78B-2-112 applies, the three-year statute of 
limitations in Section 31A-21-313(1) is tolled when interpreted consistent with common 
law principles. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (adopting common law of England as 
the rule of decision in all courts of this state, as long as it is not in conflict with the 
constitution or laws of the state). 
It has long been recognized in this country that, as "nothing more than common 
justice" and "well supported by authorities," 
whenever a person is prevented from exercising his legal remedy by some 
paramount authority, the time during which he is thus prevented is not to be 
counted against him in determining whether the statute of limitations has barred 
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his right, even though the statute makes no specific exception in his favor in such 
cases. 
State ex rel Brown v. Scottish American Mortgage Co., I l l Miss. 98, 71 So. 291 (1916), 
quoting St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Olson, 87 Minn. 117, 91 N.W. 294, citing, inter alia, Braun v. 
Sauerwein, 77 U.S. 218, 10 Wall. 218 (1870) (describing history of rule in state courts 
that, "when the [plaintiff] has been disabled to sue, by a superior power, without any 
default of his own . . . that unless the statutes cease to run during the continuance of the 
supervening disability, he is deprived of a portion of the time within which the law 
contemplated he might sue"); 51 AM. JUR. 2 D Limitation of Actions § 170 ("most courts 
recognized a limited class of exceptions [tolling statutes of limitations] arising from 
necessity, as in the case of inability to bring suit or to exercise one's remedy"); 54 CJ.S. 
Limitations of Actions § 156 ("where one is prevented from suing by some paramount 
authority, the running of the statute of limitations may be tolled and the time during 
which the plaintiff is thus precluded from exercising his or her legal remedy is not to be 
counted against him or her in determining whether the applicable statute of limitations 
has barred the plaintiffs right of action"); Mergenthaler v. Asbestos Corporation of 
America, 500 A.2d 1357, 1363-1365 (Del. Super. 1985) (analyzing history of general rule 
suspending statute of limitations during period in which plaintiff is precluded from filing 
suit). 
The trial court appeared to recognize this concept, but stated: "While it is true that 
many courts, including Utah, agree with such a policy as a general principle, the 
application of that principle cannot be used, as plaintiffs suggest here, to contravene the 
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express language of a statute, nor have plaintiffs cited any case law which persuades the 
court that such an application of this principle is warranted in the instant case." (R. 962.) 
As noted above, however, the application of tolling principles does not 
"contravene" a statute of limitations. The limitation period remains fully in force; it is 
simply the method of calculating that period that is affected. By the trial court's 
definition, all of the unanimous cases and authorities cited by Stone Flood "contravene" 
statutes of limitations, yet courts have consistently so held. 
At a minimum, therefore, the first 60 days after the fire should not have counted 
toward the three-year limitation period, regardless of any other calculation issues. If 
placed into a table, even assuming correct the court's other rulings that (1) the inception 
of the loss was November 16-17, 2000, (2) the appraisal process did not start until the 
Fourth District Court entered an order granting an uncontested motion to compel 
appraisal, and (3) the Corporation was not a beneficiary of the parties' 2004 tolling 
agreement, the mathematical calculation should still read something like this: 
1 Period 
November 16-17, 2000, to 
January 16, 2001 
January 17, 2001 -July 11, 
2003 
July 12, 2003 - January 9, 
2007 
Event 
60-day period during which 
an action could not be filed. 
Period from end of 60-day 
prohibition to the date of 
Fourth District Court's 
order granting motion to 
compel appraisal 
Appraisal period 
Number of Days Counted 1 
Toward Limitations Period 1 
0 
922 
0 
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January 10, 2007 - May 22, 
,2007 
Period between appraisal 
report and filing of 
complaint 
132 days 
Even assuming all other rulings by the court to be correct, therefore, the total days 
lapsed before re-filing (922 + 132) was 1054. Three years multiplied by 365 days is 1095 
days; the Stone Flood II suit was thus filed more than a month before the limitation 
period expired. At the very least, an issue of fact exists in that regard, precluding 
summary judgment. 
C. The period of tolling for the appraisal process should have 
commenced upon Safeco's election of appraisal pursuant to the 
policy. 
By statute, u[t]he period of limitation is tolled during the period in which the 
parties conduct an appraisal or arbitration procedure prescribed by the insurance policy, 
by law, or as agreed to by the parties." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(5). The Safeco 
policy provides that, "If we and you disagree on the amount of Net Income and operating 
expenses or the amount of loss, either may make written demand for an appraisal of the 
loss. In this event, each party will select a competent and impartial appraiser...." 
No court order is required to trigger the appraisal procedure; instead, as prescribed 
the insurance policy, the appraisal process commences with a "written demand." Safeco 
issued its written demand to Stone Flood on February 3, 2003. The trial court should 
have commenced the statutory tolling for appraisals on that date. 
The trial court assumed, however, that the appraisal process did not commence 
until Safeco obtained an unopposed, unnecessary court order months later. That 
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conclusion is contrary to the language of Section 31 A-21-313(5), which states that tolling 
is in effect while the parties conduct an "appraisal . . . procedure as prescribed by the 
insurance policy " (emphasis added). 
Even if the policy had not itself identified a written demand as triggering the 
appraisal process, reference to the analogous process of arbitration may be informative. 
By statute, arbitrations in Utah are commenced by "notice" to the other party. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-11-110(1) ("A person initiates an arbitration proceeding by giving 
notice in a record to the other parties to the agreement to arbitrate in the agreed manner 
between the parties..."). 
As a final observation, the Stones note that Safeco does not claim to have made 
payment on the appraisal award - perhaps the most critical part of an appraisal procedure 
- on the day it was issued, January 9, 2007, or within three days thereafter. To the 
contrary, the record reflects that payment was made on January 17, 2007, eight days after 
the award. (R. 682.) 
In sum, the trial court should have subtracted at least 158 additional days from its 
calculation to reflect the true commencement of the appraisal process, and eight 
additional days to reflect the true end of the procedure. On either of these grounds as 
well, summary judgment was improper. 
D. Stone Flood's claims expressly fell within the parties' tolling 
agreement, or a fact issue exists on that issue. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, the parties entered into an agreement in which 
all claims of the parties to both lawsuits were to be expressly tolled pending the appraisal 
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process, and also until "discovery [was] completed". The Stone Flood II lawsuit was 
filed in May 2007, well before discovery was completed in the case (May 2009). 
The trial court concluded that the tolling agreement at least created an issue of fact 
with respect to the Stones' claims. In particular, the court found the tolling agreement 
ambiguous "as to the extent to which the Stones' individual claims were encompassed in 
that agreement and therefore tolled. As such, the court is unable to determine as a matter 
of law when the stipulated tolling period ended, disputed issues of material fact remain 
concerning the tolling period and [the] court rejects Safeco's contention that the Stones' 
claims are untimely as a matter of law." (R. 964.) 
The trial court held, however, that as a matter of law, Stone Flood's claims were 
not encompassed within the Stones' tolling agreement. (R. 964-965.) With respect, that 
conclusion is perplexing. Correspondence between counsel regarding the tolling 
agreement consistently mentioned that it contemplated both of the pending lawsuits. For 
example, a June 16, 2004, letter from Safeco's counsel (R. 693-695) summarizing the 
parties' discussions stated clearly his understanding that all claims of all parties in both 
lawsuits would be covered by the agreement: Not only does the letter's "Re:" line 
identify both cases ("Re: Stone Flood & Fire Restoration Inc. v. Safeco Insurance 
Company of America / Stone, et al., v. Safeco Insurance Company of America), but the 
letter itself says: 
With respect to the Agreement Regarding Appraisal, as set forth in my last letter 
to you it seems to me that the only agreement we need is that all of the parties in 
the two (2) separate cases will agree to be bound by the single appraisal process. 
That way, we can make certain that all parties understand that the single appraisal 
process covers all of the contract claims being asserted in both actions. 
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Id, <|j4. The letter then lays out the appraisal process that the parties followed. 
Again mentioning both lawsuits in the Re: line, another letter from Safeco's 
counsel dated May 26, 2004 (R. 680) states: "I have received authority to agree to a 
consolidation of the appraisal process for the two (2) pending cases. I would propose that 
we file a joint motion to stay the most recently filed case and have our clients agree that 
the appraisal process will include the amounts being claimed by all Plaintiffs." 
Moreover, counsel for Stone Flood testified that he allowed Stone Flood I to be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute in reliance upon the tolling agreement. (R. 288, f 67; 
408.) No evidence of any contrary understanding was offered by Safeco or its counsel. 
It seems fairly clear from this evidence that Safeco and the plaintiffs in both cases 
agreed to put all litigation involving them on hold for the same period of time and for the 
same reasons. At the very least, an issue of fact exists in that regard. The trial court 
ruled, however, that the correspondence 
is simply insufficient as prima facie evidence that Stone Flood's claims were 
anticipated by the parties or encompassed by the Tolling Agreement. To the 
contrary, it is evident to the court that Stone Flood's claims were not included in 
the Tolling Agreement, since the statutory provision applied to Stone Flood as the 
named insureds and was in effect at that time. As such, a separate tolling 
agreement would have been unnecessary to preserve Stone Flood's claims until 
the end of the appraisal process and the dismissal of the Fourth District case. 
(R. 964-965.) 
There are several problems with this analysis. First, the court failed to account for 
the testimony of the Stones' counsel about the parties' communications and his 
understanding of the agreement. Second, the court failed to explain why, if Stone Flood 
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was not part of the tolling agreement, its name and lawsuit were repeatedly mentioned in 
the parties' correspondence. (R. 676-680; 693-695.) 
Moreover, the trial court's reasoning is flawed: The court says that including 
Stone Flood in the tolling agreement would have been unnecessary because the statute of 
limitations on its claims was already tolled by the appraisal process. But that conclusion 
fails to recognize that the tolling agreement extended not just to the end of the appraisal 
process, but to the subsequent completion of discovery. Consequently, the trial court's 
assumption that the contractually agreed tolling period was co-extensive with the 
appraisal tolling period is a factual misapprehension. 
In any event, the trial court's analysis ignores reality. Under the court's rationale, 
the parties' own reference to and inclusion of the two cases is negated entirely because "a 
separate tolling agreement would have been unnecessary to preserve Stone Flood's 
claims" because of a statutory tolling provision. But attorneys put things in writing all 
the time that might already result from operation of law. Why would parties ever sign 
releases upon settlement of a lawsuit that is dismissed with prejudice? After all, res 
judicata would bar claims that were or could have been brought in the pending lawsuit. 
Attorneys are entitled to seek the greatest degree of protection for their clients, or 
in the hope of minimizing disputes. There is no authority that a contract is less 
enforceable if it merely restates existing rights than if it grants additional rights. 
Additionally, the parties' correspondence reflects an agreement that, upon the 
completion of Appraisal, the parties would discuss settlement of the claims before 
proceeding with litigation. Per those discussions, the time expended on (ultimately 
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unsuccessful) settlement negotiations - again, exceeding three days - should not have 
counted toward the limitation period. 
For all of the above reasons, a fact issue exists as to the scope of the parties' 
tolling agreement, and summary judgment should not have been granted. 
II. JAMES AND PATRICE HAVE STANDING TO ASSERT THEIR 
PERSONAL CLAIMS. 
In the court below, Safeco argued that the Stones lacked standing to bring any 
personal claims because they were not insureds under the policy. (R. 151-154; 156-160.) 
The trial court ultimately agreed. (R. 951-957.) 
A. An issue of fact exists as to whether Safeco effectively deemed 
the Stones to be, or imposed obligations on the Stones as, 
insureds. 
There is evidence in the record that Safeco itself treated the Stones as insureds. 
For example, as noted previously, before paying any benefits under the policy, Safeco 
required James and Patrice personally to sign a non-waiver agreement that identified 
James Stone as "the insured," and Patrice as his "spouse." {See R. 664.) Unless Safeco 
admits that it was refusing to pay benefits to an insured unless a non-insured guaranteed 
repayment - which would be bad faith as a matter of law - then Safeco must concede that 
the Stones were de facto insureds.11 
11
 Both Jim and Patrice were required to sign, which would not have been necessary if the 
signature was merely on behalf of the corporation, in which case a single authorized 
signature would suffice. Moreover, Safeco is a sophisticated client, and was presumably 
well aware of the settled principle that signatures that are not accompanied by a clear 
statement of corporate capacity are deemed to be in the signer's personal capacity. DBL 
Distributing, Inc. v. 1 Cache, LLC, 2006 UT App 400, \ 13, 147 P.3d 478, and numerous 
cases cited. 
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The trial court disregarded this evidence, concluding that the policy "clearly 
identifies Stone Flood & Fire Restoration, I n c . . . . as the named insureds," and "[t]here is 
no reference to coverage being extended to unnamed insureds." (R. 957.) 
With respect, the trial court failed to address the Stones' actual argument. The 
Stones did not argue that the policy by its language encompassed "unnamed insureds"; 
they argued that, by virtue of its actions, Safeco imposed obligations upon the Stones that 
effectively deemed, or recognized, the Stones as insureds under the policy. Thus, for 
example, Safeco never identified any provision of the policy that could allow it to force 
the Stones individually to guarantee reimbursement of payments made to the corporation, 
unless the Stones themselves were insureds under the policy. 
Safeco's actions created an issue of fact as to whether the Stones qualified as 
insureds under the policy. 
B. Safeco's argument fails in any event with respect to the Stones' 
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and bad 
faith. 
The trial court found that sufficient evidence existed of outrageous conduct by 
Safeco to support a claim by the Stones for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
However, the Court concluded that such a claim is barred by the Utah Court of Appeals' 
ruling in Stocks v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 2000 UT App 139, 3 P.3d 
722. ("Although a material issue of act precludes summary judgment on the Stones' 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Stones do not have standing 
under Stocks:') (See R. 952.) 
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Although the trial court felt bound by the Court of Appeals' ruling, the court 
appeared to have some misgivings about the application of Stocks to closely held 
corporations. The court first wrote: 
At the initial hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the court 
expressed the view that the Stones might have standing to assert claims of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court based that view on the close 
economic connection between the Stones and the corporation. As the only 
shareholders of the corporation, the Stones looked to the corporation as their sole 
means of support. As such, it was clearly foreseeable that any outrageous conduct 
directed toward the corporation would affect the Stones in a direct and personal 
way. This is clearly distinguishable from the situation when the shareholders of a 
corporation are merely passive investors. In the court's view, the tort doctrine of 
foreseeability would provide an adequate limitation on standing that would not 
open up the prospect of shareholders routinely suing for conduct that was directed 
at a corporation. 
(R. 953.) 
The court then stated that it was obligated by Stocks to dismiss the Stones' claims: 
The court did not, however, distinguish the case of Stocks v. United States 
Fid. & Guar. Co., 2000 UT App 139, 3 P.3d 722 (2000). On further reflection, the 
court should not have ignored a case that is directly on point. 
To have standing, a plaintiff must be able to show that he has suffered some 
distinct and palpable injury. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). 
In Stocks, the Court addressed whether the individual plaintiffs had standing to 
recover personally for costs and emotional distress damages from an insurance 
company's breach of contract and failure to provide proper insurance coverage. 
Generally, although a shareholder may own all of the stock in a 
corporation, such ownership does not authorize him to sue as an individual for 
wrong done to the corporation by a third party. Stocks, 2000 UT App 139 at [^11 
quoting Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (Utah 
1979). However, "a shareholder may bring an individual cause of action if the 
harm to the corporation also damaged the shareholder as an individual rather than 
a shareholder . . . in cases which the wrong itself is a violation of a duty arising 
from a contract or otherwise, and owed directly to the shareholder." Stocks, 2000 
UT App 139 at 1fll quoting DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 598 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
The Court [of Appeals] declined to confer standing on the Stocks, finding 
that the Stocks' injuries, including that for intentional infliction of emotional 
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distress, resulted from damage to their corporation, not as a direct result of any 
breach or damage to the Stocks personally. 
Here, like Stocks, the injuries claimed by the Stones have arisen 
derivatively from the damage suffered by the corporation, namely Stone Flood. 
As plaintiffs admit, the alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress was 
caused by Safeco's alleged failure to make timely payments under the insurance 
policies for Stone Flood's losses and the resulting collapse of Stone Flood, not out 
of a duty owed to the Stones as individuals. 
(R. 953-954 [ellipse in original; bracketed text added].) 
In concluding its analysis, the court recognized the implications of its ruling on the 
Stones and others in their position: 
The court is not unaware that by making this ruling, sole shareholders in a closely 
held family business are effectively barred from bringing a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress against an insurer, either on behalf of themselves as 
individuals or on behalf of their corporation. However, this court is bound by the 
decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals and must make its rulings in conformance 
therewith. 
(R. 956.) 
The Stones respectfully submit that the trial court erred in interpreting Stocks, and 
also that Stocks does not address the facts presented here, nor accurately reflect Utah law 
on the subject. 
The Stocks court recognized that individuals who happen to be shareholders may 
pursue personal claims if the defendant is alleged to have breached an independent duty 
to them. Safeco's duty not to intentionally or recklessly inflict severe emotional distress 
upon the Stones was wholly separate and distinct from contractual duties owed to Stone 
Flood. A claim for IIED does not require privity or other contractual relationship; rather, 
any victim of conduct committed "where any reasonable person would have known that 
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[severe emotional distress] would result" may pursue a claim. Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, 
Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, |^ 58 (articulating elements of IIED claim). 
Moreover, Stocks either does not apply, or does not correctly predict Utah law, 
under the circumstances presented here. Stocks applies only to quasi-derivative claims, in 
which a shareholder is essentially pursuing claims that belong solely to the corporation. 
This Court has not addressed the issue, but some courts have held that individuals may 
sue if they have suffered injury as the result of a personal guaranty, as in the case here. 
See, e.g., Sacks v. American Fletcher National Bank and Trust Co., 258 Ind. 189, 279 
N.E.2d 807, 812 (1972) ("[I]t is clear a personal guaranty for a loan to a corporation can 
be the basis for a personal cause of action."); Davis v. United States Gypsum Co., 451 
F.2d 659, 662 (3rd Cir. 1971) (applying Pennsylvania law); see also Weiss v. Northwest 
Acceptance Corp., 274 Or. 343, 546 P.2d 1065, 1070 (Ore. 1976) (recognizing that 
individual shareholder may sue if he was induced by defendant's wrongful acts to assume 
corporate liability). 
Moreover, permitting the Stones to pursue claims in this case would not implicate 
the policy concerns that bar most individual-shareholder lawsuits. Stone Flood was a 
closely held corporation; the impact of breaches on these individuals was not only 
foreseeable but known to Safeco, and there is no multitude of passive shareholder claims 
lurking. 
Shareholders of a closely held corporation are foreseeable beneficiaries of a 
property insurance policy. See, e.g., Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 
802 (Utah 1985) ("it is axiomatic that insurance frequently is purchased not only to 
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provide funds in case of loss, but to provide peace of mind for the insured or his 
beneficiaries") (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1); 
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 173 P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 
1989). 
Additionally, unlike the circumstances considered by Utah appellate courts to date, 
Safeco was informed in advance, and with specificity, of what James and Patrice were 
being forced to do because of its breach of duties. Safeco's adjuster knew that payroll 
was every two weeks, and that, by refusing to pay anything toward business interruption 
for months, Safeco was forcing the Stones to infuse their own money to meet the 
corporation's legal obligations to its employees. See Statement of Facts, p. 10. Safeco's 
actions, if believed by a jury, violated duties to Stones as known beneficiaries under the 
policy. 
Under the circumstances of this case, Utah law should not preclude James and 
Patrice from pursuing claims apart from Stone Flood. 
C. James and Patrice also have standing because of statutorily 
imposed personal liability. 
Finally, James and Patrice have standing as named plaintiffs because, as a result of 
Safeco's breaches, personal liability to the corporation's creditors has been imposed upon 
them by statute. The trial court did not address this contention. However, as mentioned 
above, Safeco's failure to pay benefits within a reasonable period of time forced Stone 
Flood into dissolution. Under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408(2), personal liability for 
corporate debts was imposed upon the Stones, to the extent that the Stones received any 
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corporate assets. In other words, Safeco's breaches directly deprived the Stones of 
distributions which they otherwise would have been entitled to retain - a distinct and 
palpable injury. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, appellants respectfully request the Court reverse 
the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case for trial. 
DATED this 18th day of October, 2010. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
o 
MAK ( ij, ^ , ^ 
L. Rich Humphreys 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 18th day of October, 2010, two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS were mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Matthew L. Lalli 
Troy L. Booher 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellee 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
L. Rich Humpheiy^ 
Karra J. Porter 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on All Claims - 11/03/2009 
Tentative Ruling for Hearing February 5, 2010 - 01/26/2010 
Order Granting Motion to Reconsider and Dismissing All Remaining Claims -
02/05/2010 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STONE FLOOD AND FIRE 
RESTORATION, INC., JAMES K. 
STONE AND PATRICE STONE, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
AMERICA, 
Defendant. 
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 
IN PART AND DENYING IN 
PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON ALL CLAIMS 
Civil No. 070907640 
Honorable Anthony Quinn 
On October 9, 2009, and October 14, 2009, the court heard arguments on Safeco 
Insurance Company of America's motion for summary judgment. At the hearings, Safeco was 
represented by Matthew Lalli and Troy Booher, and Stone Flood and Fire Restoration Inc., 
James Stone, and Patrice Stone were represented by Rich Humpherys and Karra Porter. After 
having reviewed the written submissions and having heard oral argument, and for good cause, 
the court grants in part and denies in part the motion for summary judgment, and rules as 
follows. 
10644735 
In ruling on the motion, it is useful to divide those claims brought by the Stones as 
individuals and those brought by Stone Flood as a corporation and an insured under the Safeco 
insurance policy. On May 22, 2007, Stone Flood filed claims for (i) breach of contract; 
(ii) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (iii) misrepresentation and fraud; 
(iv) negligent misrepresentation; and (v) deceptive advertising. On September 17, 2007, the 
Stones filed claims for (i) breach of contract; (ii) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing; (iii) misrepresentation and fraud; (iv) negligent misrepresentation; (v) deceptive 
advertising; and (vi) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Both Stone Flood and the 
Stones sought punitive damages. Safeco moved for summary judgment on all claims on the 
ground that they are untimely and that they fail as a matter of law on their merits. 
In their opposition papers, both Stone Flood and the Stones concede that summary 
judgment is appropriate on their claims for deceptive advertising. The court therefore grants the 
motion for summary judgment on the deceptive advertising claims. 
The court also grants the motion for summary judgment on Stone Flood's remaining 
claims on the ground that they are untimely under the applicable statutes of limitation, which are 
(i) the 3-year statute of limitation governing the two contract claims in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
21-313(1) (2000); and (ii) the 3-year statute of limitation governing the two fraud and 
misrepresentation claims in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(1) (2000). Stone Flood incurred an 
insurable loss when a fire destroyed the building in which Stone Flood did business on 
November 16-17, 2000. Stone Flood did not file the current lawsuit until May 22, 2007, well 
outside the 3-year period. 
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Under section 31A-21-313, the statute of limitation for Stone Flood's two contract claims 
was tolled during the period in which Stone Flood and Safeco conducted an appraisal concerning 
the insured loss. The appraisal was ordered on July 11, 2003, and concluded on January 9, 2007. 
Excluding the time period of July 11, 2003, to January 9, 2007, Stone Flood still filed its claim 
outside the 3-year time period. And the savings statute does not apply because Stone Flood's 
first lawsuit was dismissed on September 16,2005, more than a year before Stone Flood's filing 
this lawsuit on May 22, 2007. Therefore, all of Stone Flood's claims are barred by the applicable 
statutes of limitation. The court grants the motion for summary judgment on Stone Flood's 
remaining claims. 
As for the question of whether the Stones' claims are time barred, a disputed issue of 
material fact precludes summary judgment. The statutes of limitation applicable to the Stones' 
claims are (i) the 3-year statute of limitation governing the two contract claims in Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-21-313(1) (2000); (ii) the 3-year statute of limitation governing the two fraud and 
misrepresentation claims in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-21-313(l) (2000); and (iii) the 4-year statute 
of limitation governing claims involving intentional infliction of emotional distress in Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (2000). On June 14, 2004, Safeco signed a stipulation in which it agreed the 
Stones' then-pending claims would be tolled "until discovery is completed." The court is unable 
to determine as a matter of law what discovery Safeco and the Stones were referring to in the 
stipulation, and therefore, the court is unable to conclude as a matter of law when the stipulated 
tolling period ended. Because disputed issues of material fact remain concerning the tolling 
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period, the court rejects Safeco's contention that the Stones' claims are untimely as a matter of 
law. The court therefore must address the merits of the Stones' remaining claims. 
As to the Stones' two contract claims, the Stones lack standing to bring these claims 
because they are not insureds under the insurance policy with Safeco. The court rejects the 
Stones' argument that they became insureds after the fire when they signed a "non-waiver 
agreement" in which they agreed that Safeco was not waiving its right to deny coverage by its 
investigation of the claim. This "non-waiver agreement" is insufficient to create a disputed issue 
of material fact concerning whether the Stones were insureds under the policy. The policy itself 
does not list them as insureds. Because the Stones, as individuals, are not insureds, their contract 
claims fail as a matter of law. The court grants the motion for summary judgment on the Stones' 
two contract claims. 
The Stones' fraud and misrepresentation claims also fail as a matter of law. All of the 
alleged misrepresentations concern Safeco's promises to perform in certain ways at some future 
time. Safeco contends that it intended to perform as it represented when it made the alleged 
representations. The Stones have not alleged, and have not provided any evidence, that at the 
time Safeco made any of the alleged misrepresentations concerning Safeco's future performance, 
Safeco did not intend to perform as it represented. Because the Stones' fraud and 
misrepresentation claims require proof that Safeco did not intend to perform as it represented at 
the time Safeco made the representations, those claims fail as a matter of law. The court grants 
the motion for summary judgment on the Stones' two fraud and misrepresentation claims. 
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A disputed issue of material fact precludes summary judgment on the Stones' claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court finds that, from the totality of evidence 
presented, a question of fact exists as to whether Safeco engaged in outrageous conduct toward 
the Stones, and whether it was foreseeable that its alleged conduct would cause the Stones severe 
emotional distress. For these reasons, summary judgment is not appropriate on the Stones' claim 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
Safeco's motion for summary judgment is granted as to all claims except the Stones' 
individual claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. All other claims are hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. 
Karra Porter 
Christensen & Jensen, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ffi day of October, 2009,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be sent via first-class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
L. Rich Humpherys 
Karra J. Porter 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STONE FLOOD AND FIRE RESTORATION: TENTATIVE RULING FOR 
INC., JAMES K. STONE AND HEARING FEB. 5, 2 010 
PATRICE STONE, 
CASE NO. 070907640 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. DATE: JANUARY £0?, 2 010 
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
AMERICA, JUDGE: ANTHONY B. QUINN 
Defendant. 
The above matter came before the court on plaintiffs' rule 
54(b) motion to revise order. The court, having carefully 
considered the motion and relevant law, hereby rules as follows: 
I. Background 
On October 9, 2009 and October 14, 2009, the court heard 
arguments on defendant's motion for summary judgment. Defendant 
argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because plaintiffs' 
claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the 
Stones lacked standing to sue Safeco and the undisputed evidence 
entitled Safeco to judgment as a matter of law on all claims. 
After consideration of the parties' arguments and briefs, the 
court entered a proposed order on November 3, 2009 ("the Order"). 
The court granted summary judgment on all claims for deceptive 
advertising, acknowledging the plaintiffs' concession that summary 
judgment was appropriate, found sill of Stone Flood's remaining 
claims were untimely under the 3-year statute of limitation set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-313(1), denied summary judgment on 
the Stones' individual claims on the basis of untimeliness, granted 
summary judgment on the Stones' individual contract claims because 
the Stones lack standing, found that the Stones did not allege and 
did not provide any evidence that at the time Safeco made any of 
the alleged misrepresentations concerning its future performance, 
it did not intend to perform as it represented, and ruled that a 
material issue of disputed fact precluded summary judgment on the 
Stones' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
Plaintiff timely objected to the Order, arguing that all 
claims were timely because the court erred in calculating the 
statute of limitations, the 2004 Tolling Agreement covered all 
parties to the current litigation thus extending the statute of 
limitations, and the statute of limitations was tolled by 
continuing negotiations between the parties. 
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II. Rule 54(b) Motion to Revise Order 
A. Standard of Review 
Under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "an 
order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time 
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b); 
see also Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, 635 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 73. 
The factors to be considered in determining the propriety of 
reconsidering a prior ruling, include, but are not limited to, 
"when (1) the matter is presented in a 'different light' or under 
'different circumstances;' (2) there has been a change in the 
governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) 'manifest 
injustice' will result if the court does not reconsider the prior 
ruling; (5) a court needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an 
issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the 
court." Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P. 2d 1306, 1311 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) . 
The court finds that there is cause to reexamine its Order and 
hereby makes the following rulings. 
III. Discussion 
A. The Stones' Tort Claims 
2. The Stones' individual tort claims for fraud and 
misrepresentation fail as a matter of law because there 
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is no evidence that Safeco did not intend to perform when 
it made the alleged representations. 
As discussed in the Order, the Stones' fraud and 
misrepresentation claims fail as a matter of law. u [A] 
misrepresentation of intended future performance is not a 
representation concerning a 'presently existing fact' upon which a 
claim for fraud can be based unless . . . [the plaintiff] . . .can prove 
that. .. [the defendant] . .., at the time of the representation, did 
not intend to perform the promise and made the representation for 
the purpose of deceiving [the plaintiff] . Republic Group, Inc. v. 
Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Here, the Stones have not alleged and have provided the court 
with no evidence that, at the time the alleged misrepresentations 
concerning Safeco"s future performance were made, Safeco did not 
intend to perform as it represented to the Stones. When considered 
with Safeco's assertion that it and its agents intended to perform 
as represented to the Stones1, the Stones have failed to support a 
claim for fraud or misrepresentation, and their claims fail as a 
matter of law. 
2. Although a material issue of fact precludes summary 
judgment on the Stones' claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, the Stones do not have standing 
under Stocks. 
As discussed in Order, the court reviewed the totality of the 
*See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 12-14 
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evidence before it on the motion for summary judgment and found 
that a material question of fact existed as to whether Safeco 
engaged in outrageous conduct towards the Stones and whether it was 
foreseeable that such conduct would cause the Stones severe 
emotional distress. Having again read the parties' briefs and 
considered the facts before it, the court concludes its decisoin 
was reasonable, but not supported by existing case law. 
At the initial hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the 
court expressed the view that the Stones might have standing to 
assert claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The 
court based that view on the close economic connection between the 
Stones and the corporation. As the only shareholders of the 
corporation, the Stones looked to the corporation as their sole 
means of support. As such, it was clearly foreseeable that any 
outrageous conduct directed toward the corporation would affect the 
Stones in a direct and personal way. This is clearly 
distinguishable from the situation when the shareholders of a 
corporation are mere passive investors. In the court's view, the 
tort doctrine of foreseeability would provide an adequate 
limitation on standing that would not open up the prospect of 
shareholders routinely suing for conduct that was directed at a 
corporation. The court did not, however, distinguish the case of 
Stocks v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 2000 UT App. 139, 3 P. 3d 
722 (2000) . On further reflection, the court should not have 
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ignored a case that is directly on point. 
To have standing, a plaintiff must be able to show that he has 
suffered some distinct and palpable injury. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 
P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). In Stocks, the Court addressed 
whether the individual plaintiffs had standing to recover 
personally for costs and emotional distress damages from an 
insurance company's breach of contract and failure to provide 
proper insurance coverage. 
Generally, although a shareholder may own all of the stock in 
a corporation, such ownership does not authorize him to sue as an 
individual for wrong done to the corporation by a third party. 
Stocks, 2000 UT App 139 at 1|ll quoting Norman v. Murray First 
Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P. 2d 1028, 1031-32 (Utah 1979) . However, "a 
shareholder may bring an individual cause of action if the harm to 
the corporation also damaged the shareholder as an individual 
rather than a shareholder... in cases which the wrong itself is a 
violation of a duty arising from a contract or otherwise, and owed 
directly to the shareholder." Stocks, 2000 UT App 139 at fll 
quoting VLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 P. 2d 593, 598 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). 
The Court declined to confer standing to the Stocks, finding 
that the Stocks' injuries, including that for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, resulted from damage to their 
corporation, not as a direct result of any breach or damage to the 
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Stocks personally. 
Here, like Stocks, the injuries claimed by the Stones have 
arisen derivatively from the damage suffered by the corporation, 
namely Stone Flood. As plaintiffs admit, the alleged intentional 
infliction of emotional distress was caused by Safeco's alleged 
failure to make timely payments under the insurance policies for 
Stone Flood's losses and the resulting collapse of Stone Flood, not 
out of a duty owed to the Stones as individuals. Additionally, the 
Stones are not named insureds and therefore could not make an 
independent claim for insurance coverage with Safeco. Such 
indirect injury is insufficient to confer standing. 
Finally, plaintiff's reliance on Campbell vr State Farm is 
misplaced. Plaintiffs state that under Campbell, the Court 
rejected the idea that only a named insured can bring claims 
arising out of a breach of duty by an insurance policy. 
First, this issue was not definitively addressed by the Court. 
To the contrary, the Court appears to have adopted the Campbells' 
statement that they were both insured under the policy issued by 
State Farm. Campbell, 840 P. 2d 130, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Second, while the Court noted that it "decline[d] to address State 
Farm's argument that Mrs. Campbell lacks standing...finding it to 
be without merit," that is the extent of the discussion. Id. at 
143. Whether State Farm argued that Mrs. Campbell lacked standing 
because she was not named under the policy, or whether State Farm 
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argued another reason why Mrs. Campbell lacked standing, is 
unclear. Absent more, this court cannot accept plaintiffs' 
characterization of Campbell, nor can it find definitively that the 
Court found that an unnamed insured can bring claims arising out of 
a breach of duty by an insurance policy. 
The court is not unaware that by making this ruling, sole 
shareholders in a closely held family business are effectively 
barred from bringing a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress against an insurer, either on behalf of 
themselves as individuals or on behalf of their corporation. 
However, this court is bound by the decisions of the Utah Court of 
Appeals and must make its rulings in conformance therewith. 
Therefore, finding no reasonable basis to distinguish the case 
at bar from Stocks, and finding Campbell inapplicable, the court 
revises its earlier ruling and finds that the Stones lack standing 
for their intentional infliction of emotional distress claim 
because it is derivative of the claims suffered by Stone Flood and 
therefore not a duty "owed directly" to the Stones. 
B. The Stone's Contract Claims 
In their opposition to summary judgment, the Stones argue that 
although they are not individually identified as named insureds on 
the Safeco policies, the Stones are xxbeneficiaries and/or unnamed 
insureds." In support of this contention, plaintiffs offer the 
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court "a non-waiver agreement that identified James Stone as the 
insured and Patrice Stone as his spouse." Plaintiffs also offers 
a single reference to an internal Safeco record which refers to Jim 
and Patrice Stone as "insureds."2 
Plaintiffs are clearly not named insureds. The Commercial 
Policy Change issued by Safeco on October 31, 2000 clearly 
identifies Stone Flood & Fire Restoration, Inc; Dust Free Floors 
Finishing Inc.; and Aqua Clean Corp. as the named insureds. The 
policies each state that "[t]hroughout this policy the words "you" 
and "your" refer to the Named Insured shown in the Declarations." 
There is no reference to coverage being extended to unnamed 
insureds. Absent any such proof, plaintiffs' assertions fail to 
create a material dispute of fact.3 
Because the Stones are not named insureds, and because they 
have presented this court with no evidence that they are unnamed 
insureds, they have no standing with respect to any contract 
claims. 
Plaintiffs do not argue that status as beneficiaries 
confers standing and so the court declines to address that issue. 
because neither party has provided a complete policy, it is 
impossible to for the court to decide as a matter of law whether 
unnamed insureds are covered without a complete policy. However, 
plaintiffs have the duty to provide the court with such 
information and in the absence of that information, the court 
must assume that only the named insureds are covered. 
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C. Corporate Contract Claims 
I. The Court's math and findings regarding the commencement 
of the statute of limitations are not in error. 
a. Tucker did not decide whether a statute of 
limitations could run under U.C.A. §31A-21-313(1) 
during the period when suit could not be brought 
under U.C.A. §31A-21-313(4). 
Plaintiffs argue that the court's reading of Tucker v. State 
Farm was incorrect, and that the Court's cite to U.C.A. §31A-21-
313(4) in Tucker's discussion of the applicaible statute of 
limitations indicated an implicit recognition that §31A-21-
313(4) (a) provides a sixty (60) day extension to the 3-year statute 
of limitations for first-party insurance claims, since an action 
may not be brought against an insurer on an insurance policy to 
compel payment under the policy for 60 days after proof of loss is 
furnished as required under the policy. Tucker v. State Farm, 2002 
UT 54, 53 P.3d 947., see also U.C.A §31A-21-313 (4) (a) (1953). The 
court does not agree. 
In Tucker, it was clear that the statute of limitations had 
run on the plaintiff's case, absent some theory of tolling. For 
this reason, it was not important to the Court to determine 
precisely when the statute of limitations began to run. For the 
Court's purpose, it was sufficient to accept the trial court's 
statement that "in a case involving the alleged failure to pay PIP 
benefits, the [inception of the loss occurs] no latter than the date 
on which the insurer refuses to pay the disputed PIP benefits." 
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Tucker, 2002 UT 54 at Kl5. There was no reason for the Court to 
define the phrase "inception of the loss" precisely, nor was there 
reason for the Court to consider the interplay between § 
31A-21-313(1) and § 31A-21-313(4). 
b. Inception of the loss relates to the time of the 
loss the insured was insured against began and not 
as of the date of the denial of the claim. 
Further, plaintiffs argue that the court erred in determining 
that the "inception of the loss" was the date of the fire, but 
rather began to run on the date Safeco failed to pay. In Anderson 
v. Beneficial Fire & Casualty Co.,21 Utah 2d 173 (Utah 1968), the 
Court held that the term "inception of the loss" contained in an 
insurance policy "commences to run at the time of loss or 
death. . . [and] . . .the date of an accident resulting in death, and not 
the date of death, has been held to control." Anderson, 21 Utah 2d 
at 934. In Canadian Indemnity Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car of Salt 
Lake City, IAS F.Supp. 661 (D.Utah 1990), the U.S. District Court 
interpreted and clarified Anderson in light of §31A-21-313, finding 
that the term "inception of the loss" was specifically intended by 
the Utah Legislature to refer to "the time the first loss was 
incurred." 
In the absence of any case law in this specific context to the 
contrary, the court agrees with this interpretation of §31A-21-313. 
Thus, as stated in its previous proposed order, for the purposes of 
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determining when the statute of limitations b€>gan to run, the 
inception of the loss occurred on November 16-17, 2000, the date of 
the catastrophic fire in Stone Flood's building. 
c. In order to give effect to the entire statute the 
court must decide that the statute of limitations 
began at the time of the fire. 
Further, in order to give effect to all of U.C.A. §31A-21-313, 
the court cannot accept plaintiffs' construction of the statute. 
At issue before the court is the apparent conflict between 
section 31A-21-313(1) and section 31A-21-313(4) . Under §31A-21-
313 (1) , xv [a] n action on a written policy or contract of first party 
insurance must be commenced within three years after the inception 
of the loss." By contrast, under 31A-21-313 (4) an action may not 
be brought against an insurer on an insurance policy to compel 
payment under the policy until the earlier of 60 days after proof 
of loss is furnished as required under the policy or the insurer's 
denial of full payment. Plaintiffs' argument is that 31A-21-313(4) 
should control. 
The application of a statute of limitations is a question of 
law. In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, P 19, 144 P. 3d 1129. 
Statutory interpretation is also a question of law. Sill v. Hart, 
2007 UT 45, P 5, 162 P.3d 1099. When interpreting a statute, the 
court is required to look at the plain language of the statute. 
Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). 
-12-
Here, the plain language of §31A-21-313(1) requires that a 
first-party insurance action must be brought within three years 
after the inception of the loss. That language is absolute and 
unambiguous. Section 31A-21-313(4) however, is not absolute, since 
it expressly provides that it may be waived where the complainant 
will suffer prejudice. Further, if the court were to read §31A-21-
313(4) as establishing the correct time for filing an action, it 
would render §31A-21-313(1) meaningless, since the two triggering 
events (filing the proof of claim or relying on the insurer's 
denial of payment) could conceivably occur well outside of the 
three year time period after the inception of the loss. 
Conversely, if the court were to read §31A-21-313 (1) as the 
limitation of action time-frame, §31A-21-313(4) would not be 
rendered meaningless, since if either of the two triggering events 
were to result in a claim being filed outside of the three year 
time period, the complainant could easily file a verified complaint 
alleging prejudice, thereby waiving such limitations. Moreover, a 
ruling that the statute would not begin to run until sixty days 
after the submission of a proof of loss would allow an insured to 
delay the running of the statute indefinitely. 
Therefore, the most logical and reasonable construction of the 
statute, and the one which gives full effect to both §31A-21-313(1) 
and §31A-21-313(4) , requires that an action on a written policy of 
first party insurance be filed within three years after the event 
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triggering the loss, and that such a time period cannot be extended 
by any of the conditions under §31A-21-313(4). 
For the same reason, the court cannot find that the limitation 
on the commencement of suit under §31A-21-313(4) tolls the statute 
of limitations. Therefore, since the inception of the loss 
occurred on November 16-17, 2000, the plaintiffs would have had to 
file their claim prior to November 17, 2003 in order to be timely 
under §31A-21-313.4 
Finally, the court acknowledges Plaintiffs' argument that in 
some instances, the law tolls a state of limitations during the 
time which a party is prohibited by law from bringing suit. 
Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to this policy, under §31A-21-
313(4), the court should subtract sixty days from its calculations. 
While it is true that many courts, including Utah, agree with such 
a policy as a general principle, the application of that principle 
cannot be used, as plaintiffs suggest here, to contravene the 
express language of a statute, nor have plaintiffs cited any case 
law which persuades the court that such an application of this 
principle is warranted in the instant case. 
4This does not take into account the time during 
parties conducted an appraisal, arbitration or the tolling 
agreement plaintiffs contend tolled the statute of limitations 
beyond November 17, 2003. 
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d. Section 78B-2-112 does not apply. 
Plaintiffs also argue that the court erred in not considering 
U.C.A. §786-2-112, which states that "[t]he duration of an 
injunction or statutory prohibition which delays the filing of an 
action may not be counted as part of the statute of limitations." 
If read in conjunction with §31A-21-313(a) , §78B-2-112 would extend 
the filing time in this case an additional 60 days, thereby making 
plaintiffs' claims timely. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on §78B-2-112 however, is misplaced. 
Under §31A-21-313 (1) , xx [a] n action on a written policy or contract 
of first party insurance must be commenced within three years after 
the inception of the loss." §31A-21-313(2) reads that "[e]xcept as 
provided in Subsection (1) [namely 31A-21-313(1)] or elsewhere in 
this title [namely Title 31A-Insurance Code], the law applicable to 
limitation of actions in Title 78B, Chapter 2, Statutes of 
Limitations, applies to actions on insurance policies." Thus, 
under the plain meaning of §31A-21-313 (2), any law applicable to 
the limitations of actions in Title 78B only applies if §31A-21-
313(1) does not. Therefore, §78B-2-112, which if in effect, would 
arguably extend the statute of limitations for an action on a 
written policy of insurance for an additional 60 days after proof 
of loss was furnished to the insurance company, may only be 
considered in situations where §31A-21-313 (1) does not apply, such 
as in a "third-party" insurance agreement (where the insured have 
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claims against the insurer for a bad faith failure to settle a 
third party claim). 
Here, however, plaintiffs do not contend that a "third-party" 
relationship exists between the parties, but rather that a "first-
party" relationship exists. As such, §31A-21-313(1) applies, and 
by the express language of the statute, §31A-21-313(2) does not. 
e. Court's ruling that the Tolling Agreement was 
ambiguous was not in error. 
With respect to the 2004 Tolling Agreement, the court 
reaffirms its earlier findings that the agreement is ambiguous as 
to the extent to which the Stones' individual claims were 
encompassed in that agreement and therefore tolled. As such, the 
court is unable to determine as a matter of law when the stipulated 
tolling period ended, disputed issues of material fact remain 
concerning the tolling period and court rejects Safeco's contention 
that the Stones' claims are untimely as a matter of law. 
f. Plaintiffs' letters do not constitute a tolling 
agreement. 
Although plaintiffs urge the court to accept two letters 
(dated June 16, 2004 and May 26, 2006 respectively) as evidence 
that Stone Flood and the Stones were both parties to the 2004 
Tolling Agreement, the court does not agree. The language in those 
letters is simply insufficient as prima facie evidence that Stone 
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Flood's claims were anticipated by the parties or encompassed by 
the Tolling Agreement. To the contrary, it is evident to the court 
that Stone Flood's claims were not included in the Tolling 
Agreement, since the statutory provision applied to Stone Flood as 
the named insureds and was in effect at that time. As such, a 
separate tolling agreement would have been unnecessary to preserve 
Stone Flood's claims until the end of the appraisal process and the 
dismissal of the Fourth District case. 
g. Rice is inapplicable. 
Finally, plaintiffs argue that under jRice v. Granite School 
District, 23 Utah 2d 22 (Utah 1969), the statute of limitations 
should be tolled during the period in which the parties were 
engaged in ongoing negotiations. 
The Utah courts recognize that although statutorily mandated, 
statutes of limitations may be extended in specific instances, 
including u[w]here...the delay in commencing action was induced by 
the conduct of the party sought to be charged" such that it would 
be inequitable to allow the latter to invoke the statute of 
limitations as a defense. Rice, 23 Utah 2d at 26-27. "To create 
an equitable estoppel, it is enough if the party has been induced 
to refrain from using such means or taking such action as lay in 
his power, by which he might have retrieved his position and saved 
himself from loss." Id. at 27 (internal citations omitted). 
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"The question of whether negotiations for the compromise of a 
claim or debt will give rise to an estoppel against pleading the 
statute of limitations depends upon the character of the 
negotiations and the circumstances surrounding the parties." Id. 
In Rice, the Court considered whether a defendant was estopped 
to assert the statute of limitations, ultimately finding that the 
trial court erred in entering summary judgment against plaintiff 
since a material issue of fact existed as to whether defendant was 
estopped from asserting the statute of limitations in its defense. 
Rice, however, is clearly distinguishable from the case at 
bar. First, in Rice, the plaintiff made specific allegations that 
the defendant's agent admitted liability and promised compensation 
upon several occasions. Plaintiff was led to believe that the only 
unresolved issue was the amount of her damages once her medical 
care terminated. This, the Court reasoned, was sufficient to allow 
a trier of fact to conclude that defendant's agent induced 
plaintiff to delay filing her action. 
Here, by contrast, plaintiffs have provided the court with no 
facts in the record by which to reasonably conclude that defendant 
induced plaintiffs into delaying the filing of this action. 
Rather, plaintiffs reference their statement of facts in their 
opposition to summary judgment for the general proposition that 
negotiations between the parties "occurred at various times," 
arguing that these negotiations at the very least create a material 
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issue of fact as to if defendant is estopped from relying on the 
statute of limitations to bar their claims. 
The evidence cited in support of this contention is twofold: 
(1) a January 23, 2007 letter from defendant's counsel to 
plaintiffs' counsel enclosing an additional payment of $39,571.01 
to plaintiffs; and (2) a January 8, 2004 letter discussing the 
status of certain issues between the parties. 
First, the court does not believe that two letters written 
three years apart are by themselves sufficient evidence of 
"continuing negotiations," such that plaintiffs were induced to 
delay filing the lawsuit. Second, even if the court was to find 
that the January 8, 2004 letter is evidence of continuing 
negotiations, the January 23, 2007 letter specifically notes that 
"the payment of ...funds [to plaintiff] should not be considered to 
be a waiver of any defenses that Safeco has to the claims of your 
clients should this matter continue." Pi. Ex. H (emphasis added). 
Moreover, that letter explicitly disputes plaintiffs' 
characterization of the incident, which, at the very least, should 
have put plaintiffs on notice that Safeco did not concede the 
fundamental validity of plaintiffs' claims. This is clearly 
distinguishable from Rice, where defendant arguably led plaintiffs 
to believe that there was no dispute as to the underlying validity 
of her claim. 
Plaintiffs have failed to provide the court with facts in the 
-19-
record such that reasonable minds could conclude that defendant 
induced plaintiffs to delay filing their claim under the auspices 
of these continuing negotiations and therefore the court rejects 
plaintiffs' contention that the statute of limitations was tolled 
during the pendency of this matter. 
Therefore plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration is GRANTED 
and the court's proposed order dated November 3, 2009 is revised in 
accordance with the above. 
Dated this £ (* day of January, 
£ 
ANTHONYJB. QUINN %^$^S^c} 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE^;V^4>* 
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STONE FLOOD AND FIRE 
RESTORATION, INC., JAMES K. 
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER AND DISMISSING 
ALL REMAINING CLAIMS 
Civil No. 070907640 
Honorable Anthony Quinn 
On February 5, 2010, the court heard arguments on plaintiffs Stone Flood and Fire 
Restoration Inc., James Stone, and Patrice Stone's motion to reconsider the court's November 3, 
2009 order granting in part and denying in party defendant's motion for summary judgment. At 
the hearings, defendant Safeco Insurance Company of America was represented by Matthew 
Lalli and Troy Booher, and plaintiffs were represented by Rich Humpherys. After having 
reviewed the written submissions and having heard oral argument, and for good cause, the court 
grants the motion to reconsider and, for reasons set forth more fully in the court's tentative ruling 
dated January 26, 2010 and order dated November 3, 2009, rules as follows. 
The court exercises its discretion to reconsider its prior ruling on Safeco's motion for 
summary judgment. 
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
Safeco's motion for summary judgment is hereby reconsidered and granted in full. All 
claims are dismissed with prejudice. This constitutes the final judgment of the court. 
DATED this 5th day of February, 20&£ 
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